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The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum
key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultra-low-noise, high-
efficiency transition-edge sensor photo-detectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy state protocol
that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling
the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse
attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 85.25.Oj
Quantum key distribution (QKD), which enables users to
create a shared key with secrecy guaranteed by the laws of
physics [1], is arguably the most advanced application in the
growing field of quantum information science. Since the first
demonstration in 1992 [2], the field has advanced sufficiently
that commercial systems are now available. Most current
QKD implementations use “prepare and measure” protocols
that involve the sender (Alice) preparing a single photon in a
quantum state and sending it to the receiver (Bob), who then
measures the photon. Attempts by an eavesdropper (Eve) to
obtain information about the state of the single photon will
introduce an error rate in the transmission, which alerts the
users to Eve’s presence.
For example, to implement the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol [3], Alice randomly encodes a single photon
with either a 0 or a 1 in one of two conjugate bases and sends
the photon to Bob. Bob performs a measurement in one of
the two bases, and communicates the time slots for which he
obtained detection events. Alice and Bob then create a sifted
key by only retaining events where they used the same ba-
sis. Ideally, Alice’s sifted bits should be perfectly correlated
with Bob’s if Eve did not attack the transmission, but any real
system has error rates due to experimental imperfections. Er-
ror correction [4] removes these errors, leaving Alice and Bob
with a perfectly correlated key. However, this key is not yet
completely secret because, in principle, the errors may have
arisen from Eve attacking the system. Therefore, a final step
of privacy amplification [5] is used to obtain a shorter, secret
key about which Eve has negligible information.
The lack of readily available single-photon sources, espe-
cially at telecom wavelengths where most fiber-based QKD
systems operate, modifies the simple picture outlined above
considerably. If the source emits more than one photon, Eve
could remove one of the photons and store it until Bob an-
nounces his basis choice, at which time she would measure
the photon in the correct basis and learn the bit value with-
out introducing any errors. Therefore, in addition to assuming
that all errors arise from Eve’s interaction with single photons,
it is also necessary to assume that Eve can gain full informa-
tion about any sifted bits that arose from multi-photon events.
To determine the number of sifted bits that were encoded in
single photons, it is often assumed that the transmission chan-
nel acts as a simple beamsplitter [2]. However, an eavesdrop-
per with unlimited technological capabilities may modify the
channel properties so that this is no longer valid. For instance,
she may perform a photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack by
replacing the link with a lossless channel, blocking as many
single photons at the output of Alice that she can, while keep-
ing the rate of photons that Bob receives constant, and remov-
ing one photon from each multiphoton pulse [6]. Protection
against such attacks requires far more privacy amplification
than the case where a beamsplitter channel is assumed, and
if the rate of multiphotons present at the output of Alice is
greater than the rate of detection events recorded by Bob, then
Eve could have full knowledge of every sifted bit.
QKD systems often use heavily attenuated laser sources,
which results in a Poisson distribution of photon number. The
fraction of non-vacuum pulses that contain more than one
photon is approximately µ/2 when the laser is pulsed with a
mean photon number µ < 1. To keep the rate of multiphotons
sufficiently low for PNS security, it is necessary to operate
with µ on the order of the channel transmittance η, yielding a
sifted bit rate that is proportional to η2 [7]. As the transmis-
sion loss increases and the sifted bit rate decreases, detector
dark counts play an increasingly important role, eventually
leading to such high error rates that secret key generation is
impossible. For fiber QKD, where the channel transmittance
drops off exponentially with distance, the requirement of PNS
security was until recently thought to severely limit the link
length for weak coherent pulse QKD [8, 9].
The recent development of decoy state protocols [10, 11,
12, 13] has drastically improved the outlook for the security
of weak laser based QKD. Decoy-state QKD allows the users
to place a rigorous lower bound on the single photon chan-
nel transmittance, including receiver losses, and therefore the
number of detections at Bob that originated from single pho-
tons. Because no assumptions are made about modifications
to the channel transmittance by an eavesdropper, a PNS at-
tack would easily be detected. Decoy-state QKD has previ-
ously been demonstrated over link lengths of 15 and 60 km
2[14, 15], with a suggested maximum PNS-secure range of
about 140 km if InGaAs avalanche photodiodes with the best-
reported parameters for QKD in the literature are used [16].
However, those experiments employed a two-way system that
has been shown to be susceptible to Trojan horse attacks [17],
negating the purpose of QKD to create unconditionally secure
keys. In contrast, the present work was performed with a one-
way system which is much less susceptible to Trojan horse
attacks [29]. In this paper, we report on the first experimental
decoy-state QKD demonstration in a one-way QKD system
that can create unconditionally secure quantum key.
The simplest decoy state protocol requires Alice to emit sig-
nals whose µ values are randomly toggled between two values
µ1 and µ0. For a given signal, Eve does not know whether Al-
ice used µ0 or µ1, so she must treat single photon signals from
either mean photon number identically. Because the fraction
of single photon signals depends on µ, it is impossible for
Eve to perform a PNS attack by simultaneously modifying the
channel transmission correctly for more than one value of µ.
By comparing the number of detection events from µ0 and µ1
transmissions, Alice and Bob are able to place strict bounds
on the single photon transmittance of the channel.
A three-level decoy-state protocol ([µ0, µ1, µ2 = 0]) with
µ1 ≪ µ0 enables even better characterization of the channel
parameters, which can be illustrated as follow. Bob’s count
of detection events when Alice sent vacuum (µ2) provides an
estimate of the background and dark count detection proba-
bility, y0, per clock cycle of the system. From this estimate,
they can develop upper and lower bounds on y0 with a user-
defined level of confidence 1− ǫ, with ǫ≪ 1. The confidence
interval calculations in our case were computed numerically
as opposed to making a Gaussian approximation, which may
be a poor fit far out in the tails of the binomial distribution
governing both the transmission and error probabilities. Next,
they consider how many detection events Bob received when
Alice prepared mean photon number µ1 ≪ 1. After subtract-
ing off background, most of the remaining events are from
single-photon signals, providing an estimate and confidence
levels for the single photon transmittance y1. Finally, they
can utilize the lower bound on y1 to determine the number of
the stronger µ0 detection events that originated as single pho-
ton signals at Alice. While this outline is helpful for gaining
intuition, it does not explain the specific values of mean pho-
ton numbers that should be chosen for an experiment such as
ours.
More generally, the channel analysis is carried out
by simultaneously solving for the n-photon signal trans-
mittance variables yn under a set of linear inequalities
formed by confidence intervals [Y −j , Y
+
j ] on the detec-
tion probabilities per clock cycle Yj for each µj [13]:
Y −j ≤ e
−µj
∑
∞
n=0
(µj)
n
n! yn ≤ Y
+
j . The region of consis-
tent solutions forms a convex polyhedron, and a lower bound
y−1 ≤ y1 can easily be found by linear programming. A sim-
ilar set of inequalities relate the confidence intervals on the
observed bit error rates for each µj to the yn and the n-photon
bit error rates bn. While simultaneously solving both sets of
inequalities could in principle yield a tight bound on the single
photon bit error rate b1, we chose to instead use a conserva-
tive upper bound b+1 by treating all observed sifted bit errors
as having come from single-photon signals. Details on chan-
nel estimation and optimization of experimental parameters
for fiber decoy state QKD will be published separately [18].
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FIG. 1: QKD system used in this work. DFB: distributed feedback
laser; VOA: variable optical attenuator; AM: amplitude modulator;
LP: linear polarizer; RNG: random number generator.
The switched interferometer QKD system used in this work
was identical to that described in detail elsewhere [9, 19],
except for the addition of an amplitude modulator in Alice,
which was used to produce the different decoy state signal
strengths. As shown in Fig. 1, the system was composed of a
phase encoding switched interferometer and low-noise, high
efficiency single-photon sensitive superconducting transition-
edge sensors (TESs) [20, 21]. Synchronization for both Alice
and Bob was achieved through the use of a single clock, mak-
ing the system impractical for use outside the laboratory, but
straightforward modifications will yield a system with sepa-
rate clocks using quantum clock recovery techniques [22]. A
pattern generator pre-loaded with a random bit file provided
bit and basis selection for Alice, but in a practical system cryp-
tographically strong random number generators would pro-
vide the selection [22]. These two relatively minor modifica-
tions to the system will be implemented in the near future. In
contrast to our previous work using TESs in a phase encoded
system [9, 19, 23], in which we used one detector and time-
multiplexed the signals at Bob’s phase decoder, here we used
two detectors to enable operation at a higher clock rate (2.5
MHz for this experiment). The detectors had fiber-coupled
system efficiencies of 33% and 50%, which were lowered
from the detector value of 89% by the inclusion of filters to
reduce the rate of blackbody radiation reaching the detectors.
This imbalance between the two detectors reduces the entropy
of the raw key, which must be accounted for during privacy
amplification. The background rate of detection events, set by
3blackbody radiation, was 3 counts per second. The timing jit-
ter of the detectors was 100 ns FWHM, and the thermal recov-
ery time was 4 µs. The system transmitted over a 202 km link
of dark optical fiber, and shorter distances were obtained by
redefining Alice’s enclave to include some length of the opti-
cal fiber [9]. Redefining the system in this way simply means
that Alice has an extra attenuator composed of fiber that low-
ers the mean photon number exiting her enclave. Therefore,
our mapping to shorter distances is completely equivalent to
using a shorter length of fiber.
We implemented a decoy-state BB84 protocol using three
levels of µ: a high µ0, a moderate µ1, and a low µ2 that
approximates the vacuum state. The probabilities of send-
ing µ0, µ1, or µ2 were 83.1%, 12.3% and 4.6%, respectively.
Near-optimal µ values and probabilities were obtained by per-
forming simulations to maximize the secret bit rate for various
channel parameters. Because of the finite extinction ratio of
the amplitude modulator, µ2 was not zero but was instead less
than 1.0% of µ0. Use of a small nonzero value for µ2 results in
slightly worse bounds on the single photon transmission, and
this effect was included in our analysis. The user-defined con-
fidence parameter for each bound was chosen to be ǫ = 10−7,
resulting in a final key of which, with probability greater than
1− 6× 10−7, Eve knows less than one bit.
After sufficient data were collected, the bits arising from
pulses at µ0 were sifted, error corrected, and privacy ampli-
fied. After sifting, the bits were shuffled to permute the errors
and make error correction more efficient. In addition, half of
the bits, randomly chosen, were flipped by both Alice and Bob
to ensure that the final key had an equal distribution of zeros
and ones. Error correction was performed using the modi-
fied CASCADE algorithm [24], which has an efficiency of
7–13% over the Shannon limit. We performed privacy ampli-
fication using Toeplitz matrix universal hash functions [25] to
provide protection against arbitrary basis-independent attacks
[26], yielding a total of Nsec secret bits:
Nsec = s
[
1−H2
(
b+1
)]
−Nsift [fecH2 (B) + (1−H2 (z))]
where Nsift is the number of sifted bits, s is the calculated
lower bound on the number of single photons present in the
sifted key, b+1 is the calculated upper bound on the single pho-
ton error rate, fec is the efficiency of the error correction pro-
tocol relative to the Shannon limit, B is the observed error
rate for all signals that enter the sifted key, z is the fraction of
zeros in the sifted key before half the bits were flipped, and
H2 is Shannon entropy.
We collected data at two different sets of values of µ, one
selected for transmission at 85 km (corresponding to 117 km
of fiber being defined as residing within Alice) and the other
for 100 km (corresponding to 102 km of fiber residing within
Alice’s enclave). For each data set, timing windows for ac-
cepting detected events were chosen to maximize the secret
bit rate [19, 23]. From the first data set, using mean photon
numbers at the exit of Alice’s enclave of [µ0, µ1, µ2] = [0.487,
0.0639, 1.05×10−3] at 85 km, we created 9.9×103 secret bits
in 351 s from 2.2×105 sifted bits using 120 ns windows. From
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FIG. 2: Secret bit rate (bps denotes bits per second) vs transmission
distance for the two experimental data sets. The asterisks mark the
transmission distances quoted in the text. Longer distances could be
achieved in this system if different mean photon numbers are used.
the second data set, which used mean photon numbers [0.297,
0.099, 2.75×10−3] at 100 km, we generated a 1.2×104 secret
bits from 1.9×105 sifted bits collected over 828 s with 220 ns
windows. The observed error rates at µ0 for the two data sets
were 3.3% and 4%, consistent with the expected error rate due
to interferometer visibility and background counts. The lower
bounds on the fraction of sifted bits that originated as single
photons were 0.46 and 0.55, compared to 0.61 and 0.74 for a
beamsplitter channel. The number of secret bits generated is
less than the number of non-PNS-secure bits that would have
been generated at µ0 by assuming a random deletion channel
(4.4× 104 and 4.9× 104 at 85 km and 100 km, respectively),
but those numbers assume that Eve is unable to modify the
channel properties. Consequently, the secret bits generated
using our decoy state protocol are immune to PNS attacks,
whereas they would not be PNS secure under the beamsplitter
channel assumption.
Even though the µ values were chosen to be near-optimal
for particular link lengths, we can analyze the results over
other distances by redefining the system so that Alice’s en-
clave includes a different amount of the 202 km optical fiber
link [9]. Figure 2 shows the secret bit rate as a function of
transmission distance. For the data set optimized for 100 km,
we find that a secret key can be exchanged over 107 km of op-
tical fiber. Considerably longer ranges of 150–200 km should
be possible in this system by using different µ values opti-
mized for longer distances.
Because the extent to which the single photon transmittance
can be bounded is dependent on the photo-count statistics, ac-
quiring data for longer times will result in not only more secret
bits, but also a higher rate of secret bit production. Figure 3
displays the results of a simulation of longer acquisition times.
In general, the bound on single photon transmittance does not
depend on whether the quantum channel is stationary, but for
the simulation we assume that Eve does not vary her attack.
For a given confidence parameter, longer acquisition times re-
sult in a tighter lower bound on the single photon transmit-
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FIG. 3: Single photon transmittance y−1 , error rate b
+
1 , and secret bit
rate dependence on data acquisition time at 100 km. The dashed line
indicates the actual data acquisition time of 828 s at which secret bits
were generated; the other points on the graph are estimates based on
the data.
tance and a tighter upper bound on the single photon sifted bit
error rate, leading to a higher secret bit rate. For this simu-
lation, we have not adjusted the mean photon numbers used
when the data acquisition time is increased; re-optimization
of the mean photon numbers for longer times is expected to
increase the secret bit rate even further.
By incorporating low-noise transition-edge sensors into a
one-way QKD system and implementing a three-level decoy
protocol, we were able to generate key secure against PNS at-
tacks and with only very limited susceptibility to Trojan horse
attacks over 107 km of optical fiber. This distance far sur-
passes the previous maximum PNS-secure transmission dis-
tance of 67.5 km that used very weak mean photon numbers
rather than the decoy state protocol in essentially the same
system [9]. In contrast to other work, this demonstration was
the first to implement a finite-statistics protocol to bound the
channel transmittances without resorting to Gaussian approxi-
mations. We used a conservative method to estimate the error
rate on single photon signals, but future work may incorpo-
rate tighter bounds on the single photon error rate, resulting in
higher secret bit rates and longer ranges. System clock rates
as much as five times higher are expected to be achieved with
improvements in the detector readout electronics, leading to
higher secret bit rates. Based on the results of simulations, we
expect that this system is capable of PNS-secure decoy-state
QKD over 150–200 km of optical fiber, and improvements in
filtering of the ambient blackbody photons could increase this
distance even further to 250 km or more.
Note added: Recently, we became aware of similar work
performed elsewhere [27].
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